

Ruelle, D.
Mathematical Platonism reconsidered.

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From the abstract: This paper discusses current challenges to the standard Platonist philosophy of mathematics. Evidence from neurophysiology and comparison with computers reveal that the human way of conceiving mathematics bears strong marks of the specific structure of the brain, and of its shortcomings. This does not fit well with a universalist view of the conceptual nature of mathematics. Another worry comes from discussing the physical status of information in the presence of quantum mechanics and general relativity. Again, this may not fit well with the very classical Platonist *Weltanschauung*.

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